An ode to the arse: profanity and vulgarity in Molloy

After reading The Unnamable, I decided that I ought to read all of Beckett's trilogy. So I am now half-way through Molloy, and one of the most prominent motifs in this novel is Molloy's propensity for the vulgar and the profane. He constantly talks about his bodily functions, partially because he is so embodied through his failing health (his legs stiffened and he found it increasingly difficult to move as his journey progressed, and in the present-day narration, he is entirely bed-ridden and still in pain). But I think the preoccupation with excrement has a greater thematic significance.

Freudian psychology associates creativity with anal fixation; the pleasure a child gets in controlling his bowels is tied to the recognition of something that he created, an original product of his own body. Narration is a similar act of control and creation; the author acts as God in the world of the story, he creates and controls. Beckett does not hesitate to point out that the product of the human body is waste; excrement is the sum of the body's creative powers. But what about the mind?

Molloy's narrative is evidence of his creative impulse, but he is hardly in control of his work. He admits that he is uncertain of his purpose, and the more he writes, the less sure he becomes of his memory and his sense of self. His narrative is a decomposition; Molloy's body deteriorates, and so does narrative cohesion and his sense of identity. He often pauses and asks himself what he has been talking about, but the thread of thought is lost forever. Sentences begin, grow confused, and trail off unfinished. Molloy fills the role of creator through authorship, but his narrative seems destructive at worst, and at best unproductive, fading into impotent silence and inescapeable confusion.

Reproduction and sexuality would seem to be evidence of the body's ability to create something other than waste, to create new life, another human being. Molloy, however, claims that his mother "brought me into the world, through the hole in her arse," and he confuses the rectum and the vagina later on as well, as though both organs produced the same thing, served the same function, and were interchangeable (Beckett, 12). This confusion implies that humanity is created and expelled in the same way as feces, perhaps that humanity amounts to nothing but feces.

But Molloy does not seem to suggest that, despite his self-descriptions. He apologizes for his vulgar language and frequent references to the "arse hole," but he goes on to say that,

"Perhaps it is less to be thought of as the eyesore he called by its name than as the symbol of those passed over in silence, a distinction due perhaps to its centrality and its air of being a link between me and the other excrement. We underestimate this little hole, it seems to me, we call it the arse-hole and affect to despise it. But is it not rather the true portal of our being and the celebrated mouth no more than the kitchen-door. Nothing goes in, or so little, that is not rejected on the spot, or very nearly. Almost everything revolts it that comes from without and what comes from within does not seem to receive a very warm welcome either."
Beckett, Molloy, p. 74

The true portal of our being, according to Molloy, is that which is rejected as impolite and repulsive, cannot be mentioned in conversation, must be hidden and whose products are shameful and must be disposed of immediately. Excrement is a symbol of the self, not because humanity is nothing but waste, but because the true self is something that is hidden and repressed, something we are told is shameful and must be covered with perfumes and rituals. The gradual dissolution of the fictions of Molloy's self is disorienting and unsettling. He creates himself through the destruction of the traditional narrative and modes of identification. What remains, the by-product, the waste, is the self as it really is, stripped of all the fictions that make it palatable. Like the "little hole," Molloy begins to reject everything that comes from without; he frustrates others' expectations and social norms (e.g., when the police officer demands that he present his papers, Molloy hands him a handful of newspaper scraps), he offends others with his remoteness, his refusal to identify himself and explain himself, even his physical characteristics are offensive. And what comes from within Molloy does not receive a warm welcome; he deconstructs his own memory, dissolves his identity, questions everything he thinks and experiences. Molloy is somewhat inviolate in this sense; he rejects the common markers of identity, and exposes the truth that he is diffuse, unstable, fragmented, ever-changing, and incomprehensible.

The subject of sexuality is closely linked to the imagery of excrement throughout Molloy; as mentioned earlier, Molloy occasionally confuses the female reproductive organs and the rectum/ He is equally preoccupied with genitalia and excretion, and the two often are mentioned simultaneously or in close succession. In Beckett's work, sexuality is almost always alienated from reproduction and the life cycle; there are more old men than children in his plays. In Waiting For Godot, Vladimir and Estragon are tempted to hang themselves to escape boredom, but also the possibility of an erection-- sexuality is linked to death, not the creation of new life. The Unnamable posits that he is the drying, dying sperm on a pubescent boy's sheets, the waste product of a nocturnal emission; this is a wholly non-productive, solitary, and unconscious sexuality.

This theme is also present in Molloy; sexuality is alienated, lonely, incapable of creating new life, and associated with waste. Molloy's one significant sexual relationship was with an older woman; little else is certain about her, since his descriptions are confused and contradictory. But the most consistent descriptions are laden with references to her infertility; she had no breasts to speak of, she is arthritic, and described as an "old crone" he could have easily confused with his mother or even grandmother, presumably well past her fertile years. Molloy claims that he is sterile as well: "from such testicles as mine... there was nothing more to be squeezed, not a drop," and calls them "decaying circus clowns" (Beckett, 31). Their sexual union is sterile in the lack of a chance for new life, although in Beckett's literature, the cycle of life and death is so repetitive, that originality, true creation, seems impossible. The two met in a "rubbish dump," and that was the site of their first sexual encounter; a fittingly decrepit setting to emphasize the theme of waste. Sex for Molloy is devoid of passion as well; their liaisons are mechanical and routine, and he describes them so prosaically that he seems to have felt no physical attraction to her at all: "I toiled and moiled until I discharged or gave up trying or was begged by her to stop" (Beckett 51). He had other motivations to seek out a sexual partner.

Sexuality did not forge any intimacy between them either, nor any significant knowledge of the other. When he first mentions her, Molloy cannot remember her name, and as he ruminates on her memory further, he grows less certain of any of her characteristics. The narrative again serves to deconstruct, to make her even more remote from him. This is also indicative of Molloy's deep sense of alienation from all other people, his radical solitude, even in the most intimate physical contact.

Molloy's involvement with her was a response to an irrepressable, solitary need for sexual release, for a mucous membrane (it mattered not whose); his desire was wholly unrelated to emotional intimacy, or even a strong physical attraction, since he seems rather repulsed by this woman's attributes. Their relationship was defined by alienation. She remains anonymous and remote from him in every aspect; for instance, they could only have sex with him entering from behind, so he never saw her face during intercourse. This position put greater physical distance between them, touching only at the genitals and nowhere else. She might have been anyone, and Molloy even considers the possibility that he had actually had anal sex with her, then posits that she might have been a man holding his testicles during the act. She is so unknown to him that he cannot be absolutely certain of her gender (again, there is the issue with the free interchange of rectum for vagina, that sexuality is analogous to excretion in producing only waste).

Molloy's sexuality is extremely diffuse and, thereby, completely solitary; he does not self-identify with any sexual orientation, since he considers the possibility that this woman was actually a man with little distress. What does trouble him is the possibility that his relationship with this woman wasn't "true love," because of the manner of sex. His definition of love is, as one might infer, far from sentimental:

"But love is no doubt above such base contingencies. And not when you are comfortable, but when your frantic member casts about for a rubbing-place, and the unction of a little mucous membrane, and meeting with none does not beat in retreat, but retains its tumefaction, it is then no doubt that true love comes to pass, and wings away, high above the tight fit and the loose."
Beckett, Molloy, p. 53

There is no spirituality, no emotial involvement, no meanings beyond that physical interaction, and the other, of whom sexuality ought to allow deep knowledge, remains incomprehensible and radically remote.

Sexuality in Beckett is a topic worthy of separate exploration, and I think this is a topic that I should develop further, this interaction between sexuality and excrement.

If you never say your name outloud to anyone, they can never ever call you by it

I've returned! The grad school dilemma has been solved, for the most part, so now I'm back to writing these rambling little entries on literature and life.


I've inadvertantly encountered a number of discourses concerning identity and language in the past weeks, from very different sources: Samuel Beckett's novel The Unnamable, an interview on NPR, and the final chapter of Marcel Proust's Swann's Way. The essential question at hand is, what is the relationship between narrative and identity? And a subset of that is, what is the function of names in constructing an identity? Can there be a narrative without names?

I have asked these questions on this blog before, but these are questions to which I must return, continuously.

Each source provides a very different answer. The scholar on NPR insisted that there is no essential relationship between narrative and reflective consciousness; humans are not naturally narrative, and should not always use narrative as a tool in the process of reflecting on their experiences. He cited Sartre in the claim that narratives distort reality, and that reminded me of a post I had written earlier, in the particular distorting power of names. As soon as a thing is named, its identity pinned down to a consistent signifier, the name fails to address the thing's reality. A name cannot contain the thing itself, and neither can a narrative-- even a six volume narrative consisting of thousands of pages.

This notion of unnamability relates closely to Beckett's The Unnamable. The narrator of this strange novel, which has no real plot to speak of, is constantly beset by many voices, which define him and control him, forcing him to speak through a voice that is not his own, in a language that is not his own. The Unnamable longs and strives to find his own voice in this bewildering narrative, but he also desires silence. He seems to recognize that any narrative will fail to constitute an identity, or worse, will only impose on him a false identity. He yearns to recover his authentic voice, rather than continue to speak through their voices, and say something final about himself so that he may stop speaking altogether, fall into silence, and exist in pure selfhood. The tension between speech and silence is paradoxical; the only way, in the Unnamable's mind, to achieve full selfhood is to speak himself into silence, to recover his voice and then stop. I think that this is because the authentic self is so fleeting, that if he were to speak more than that single, definitive word or phrase, the voice of the other would inevitably resurface and he would have to begin the process of recovering himself again. If he could only identify when he has spoken something true of himself, and then fall silent, he would achieve ontological consistency.

According to Maimaitiming Aila, however, Beckett's characters are unwilling to entirely relinquish narrative because, without it, they sink into irrevokable oblivion. They cease to exist outside of the language that they use, especially the Unnamable, who seems to exist only as a voice. That language, though, is very inconsistent and confusing; names shift and metamorphosize, highlighting the tension between identity and anonymity. Characters have names, but they are temporally influenced; the names change over time, and through different places, suggesting that identity is not stable. Rather than the proper name functioning as "a reliable sign to designate a person, the narrators in the trilogy [of Beckett's novels Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable] hold it as a sign of the existence of a particular discourse, a moment in the stream of consciousness, and an expression of certain perceptions and ideas" (Aila, "Nothing but Dust: A Philosophical Approach to the Problem of Identity and Anonymity in Samuel Beckett's Trilogy," p. 129). This harkens back to the opening lines of The Unnamable: "Where now? Who now? When now?" These are three questions of identity; the "who" follows "where," is inseparable from "when." Time and space, then, determine identity, and because these are constantly in flux, identity is never stable.

Names are used to designate objects. In Beckett, the object changes, and the subject too, with time and place, with every possible world in which the object exists, and often, so does the name: "Beckett's practice of renaming characters reflects the idea that language obscures the reality it is attempting to depict. A name brings with it a superficial sense of a person's identity" (Rubin Rabinovitz, "Repetition and Underlying Meanings in Samuel Beckett's Trilogy," Rethinking Beckett, p. 52). The commentator on NPR would likely agree with Rabinovitz's assessment here; that language, and narrative in particular, obscures reality and is therefore inessential to the creation of an identity, perhaps even detrimental.

In The Unnamable, the difference between self and other erodes and the two become indistinguishable; the narrator is Mahood, Molloy, Worm, and all of the others who make up the shifting "they," whose voices he cannot stop from blending with, and overpowering, his own. Gradually, all of the distinguishing factors that comprise identity fall away: physical deterioration and uncertainty of the physical characteristics of one's own body (the Unnamable first says, for example, that he feels his hands are stuck to his knees, then later claims that he has no limbs at all), memory, and name, including the pronoun "I." The Unnamable questions his identity so radically that he claims that he can just as easily replace "I" with "they" or any other pronoun, any other word for that matter, and it would make no difference, because it is not he who is speaking.

In contrast to these views questioning the utility of narrativity is Proust. For Proust's narrator, language and narrative, and in the last chapter of the first volume, names are essential to comprehending reality. Language is an important part of reifying internal experience; although speech is part of the life of the mind, it also provides a link to sensual experience and physical reality. Speech is symbolic, but it's inseparable from the physical manipulation of the mouth and vocal chords; when the narrator seeks any opportunity to speak the name Swann, it's to bring Gilberte from the unreachable fantasy world she occupies in his imagination and into the concrete reality of his world. He is aware that saying words associated with her and repeating her name do not impact her at all, but they do bring something of her essence into his sphere and bridge the gap between them.

Proust does not promote the idea that the name is fully stable, however; when the narrator falls in love with Gilberte, every word and name connected with her is endowed suddenly with new meaning. His reaction to the names changes, even if the names themselves do not; the objects themselves also remain constant, uneffected by the referential shift the narrator experiences. The important thing is that the narrator's consciousness has changed, and this is why, in the final pages of Swann's Way, he laments the inability to fully recover the past; the physical relics of the past are insufficient, and so are linguistic re-tellings of past events. What he seeks to recapture is his consciousness at the time. Like the Unnamable and other characters in Beckett, the narrator is not the child whose experiences he recounts, although he remembers them. He cannot return to the consciousness of that particular moment, waiting for Gilberte in the Champs-Elysees, or to catch a glimpse of Madame Swann's carriage passing under the trees in a park. He continues to search for lost time, but he knows that it must remain, at least in part, permanently, irrecoverably lost, because he can never be that boy again. Time and place have changed, and so must he.

On that point, Proust and Beckett appear to agree (keep in mind that Samuel Beckett was a Proust scholar); a past consciousness cannot possibly be recaptured. In Krapp's Last Tape, the titular Krapp bears some resemblance to Proust's narrator; he searches his memory (for Krapp, it's recorded on spools of tape) and attempts to comprehend his past self. At times, Krapp does not recognize the voice on the tape, even though it is his own; there are considerable gaps in his memory. And there are things that he wishes he did not remember and impatiently skips over portions of his former self's narrative. At the end of Swann's Way, Proust's narrator appears to experience a similar kind of alienation from the former self. This narrator's memory is more reliable, perhaps, than Krapp's, but he nevertheless fails in the same task of recovering something of the past: "how paradoxical it is to seek in reality for the pictures that are stored in one's memory, which must inevitably lose the charm that comes to them from memory itself and from their not being apprehended by the senses. The reality that I had known no longer existed... The places we have known do not belong only to the world of space on which we map them for our convenience. They were only a thin little slice, held between the contiguous impressions that composed our life at that time; the memory of a particular image is but regret for a particular moment; and houses, roads, avenues are as fugitive, alas, as the years" (Proust, p. 606).

This is how Swann's Way ends, with a tinge of regret that the years can never be brought back to life, that places changes and the moment that has passed is gone forever. The narrative of memories that the narrator presents, however, seems to be at least a partial remedy for the impossibility of recapturing moments in the senses; he can, it seems, recapture these moments, even his former consciousness, through the act of constructing a narrative. This is where the debate arises; the NPR guest would claim that the narrative is falsifying and that he is never recapturing anything of the past, but only imposing a pseudo-reality onto his experiences. For the characters in Beckett's Trilogy, narrative adds to confusion and the oblivion of self, not the establishment of an identity. The characters' identities gradually disintegrate, and in The Unnamable, the monologue also deteriorates, slipping into contradiction and tormented uncertainty, culminating in the final words, "You must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on." While Proust's narrator can revisit and experience the entirety of his consciousness, "Beckett implies that our consciousness at its most fundamental level is elusive and anonymous, and that there will always remain an unthematic, unreflective, and opaque spot in the life of the subject" (Aila, p. 138).

Yet the narrative continues; the characters are not completely anonymous, not even the Unnamable. There is a measure of self-awareness that allows for narrative and prevents them from slipping away entirely into opaqueness. Language is an essential component of retaining a sense of self; Aila writes that "there is no point outside of language from which we come to express ourselves... the power of language becomes more and more a case of excess to such a degree that it anonymously speaks in the void: It speaks solitarily with itself in the end" (Aila, p. 141). Later, it is claimed that "Beckett thinks there is no 'I' prior to stories, to narrative, and, above all, to language. The self is a mere abstraction and fictional entity created in and through the effect of language, narrative, and self-perception" (Aila, p. 143). I'm not sure that I agree with that interpretation; language is important in Beckett, but silence, I think, is infinitely more important. On a metatheatrical level, as soon as the words end, the characters meet their demise; the curtain falls after they lapse into silence. But throughout the plays, from Hamm to Vladimir and Estragon to Krapp, the characters feel that there is something essential and authentic in silence, and so they strive toward it. It may be the end of this fabricated self created through narrative, but there could be a more genuine self, a pure experience of being without the falsifications of language, in the silence.

And what about the actor in Catastrophe? Like The Unnamable, the actor is bombarded with commands and manipulated by words, he is molded into something he is not; but then, he defies the narrative. He raises his face when he was told to keep it bowed. This is an act of self-assertion, I think, and it is wholly non-linguistic.

This post has rambled on to excessive lengths, so I think that I must lapse into silence and let this monologue end. I won't go on here, but I will be back to speak more of other things.