The Habit-Driven Life

"As a rule it is with our being reduced to a minimum that we live; most of our faculties lie dormant because they rely upon Habit, which knows what there is to be done and has no need of their services" (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vol II: Within a Budding Grove, 319).

In the first two volumes of In Search of Lost Time, habits play a major role in the activities of all the characters. Life at Combray is so uniform that the mere suggestion of an unknown visitor sends many residents into a state of anxiety. Aunt Leonie was particularly disturbed whenever she heard that there was someone unknown in Combray, and her life was so organized around routines that, should her friend be a minute late in visiting her every Sunday, she would be disconsolate and agitated for the entire day. The narrator has been extremely perturbed by any variation in his habits; in the Combray chapter of Swann's Way, he makes himself ill with anxiety whenever he cannot receive his mother's goodnight kiss; in the chapter "Madame Swann at Home," he is aggrieved when Gilberte unexpectedly cannot come to the Champs Elysees; and he eventually utilizes the force of habit to make himself stop loving Gilberte. Madame Verdurin demands the unwavering devotion and regularity of her "faithful," every Wednesday, and in the second volume, Odette Swann is on her way to forming her own salon of society ladies. Such social interactions are dictated by habitual roles each person is expected to play, and conventional opinions which the entire group must hold in common, and as a result, the individual becomes engulfed in and defined by his habits, his conventions.

This calming but deadening effect of habits, and the unsettling awakening of the senses when those habits are impossible to maintain, reminds me of Jean-Paul Sartre's novel Nausea, which centers on nauseating sensations of unfamiliarity, which arise from confronting reality without the filter of imposed interpretations of reality. In Search of Lost Time is by no means an existential novel, but there is an affinity here between the narrator's sense of intense anxiety when he is unable to maintain his habits, and the feeling of nausea that Sartre's character Roquentin experiences when contemplating things stripped of the meanings and even his own perceptions. For Sartre, those perceptions and customary interpretations of things, events, people, etc. obscure their reality. Proust's narrator has a more genuine confrontation with existence in this section of the novel, "Place-Names: The Place" than he has ever had before. Early on in Within a Budding Grove, the narrator deliberately chooses to see his favorite actress in a play he knows by heart, so that he can immediately dissect what she adds to the text. He is distraught that he cannot readily interpret Berma's performance of Phaedre without the authority of the text because her words fly by too quickly. Afterwards, he seeks external authority to verify that she is indeed a great actress, to counteract his own feelings of disappointment and blankness. As a young adolescent, he depends upon authorities to provide him with ready interpretations of everything; he looks to Swann to judge art for him, M. de Norpois to give him the meaning of Berma's acting, and Bergotte as the standard of his own writing, to his grandmother for social cues and judgment of potential acquaintances. With all of these filters of interpretation, the narrator is spared a direct confrontation with reality; everything is predetermined and externalized, and he need not do any work to comprehend his surroundings.

But when he abandons his habits (or more appropriately, when he is forced to abandon them, since he is a self-described creature of habit), he is sent into confusion and anxiety because of the astonishing richness of reality. There is a sense of fear, and a fear of loss, of death perhaps, when he is separated from his habitual existence. Life becomes incomprehensible because the ready interpretations no longer apply; he is forced to use all of his faculties, which come rushing back into his consciousness, in order to create new meaning. This is a difficult, frightening task, but one that he eventually comes to see as a source of joy. As his consciousness pullulates, the narrator becomes more self-aware and more interested in exploring his relation to things outside of himself; in the first volume, his imagination was such a powerful force that he was content to simply dream and escape into himself, but in this second volume, he is more apt to reach out, to contemplate the relationship between that external reality of other people and his internal reality, how his impressions and internal states create meaning that does not exist objectively. I think the intense anxiety that the objective reality of things which he cannot fully access, the recognition of his own imposition of meaning onto the outside world, provokes him to create new habits, to ease the pain of acute consciousness and the strain of using all of his faculties. There is something seductive in living thoughtlessly and automatically, in a sedated state like the Lotus Eaters in the Odyssey, because one is free of anxiety; but then, as the narrator writes toward the beginning of this chapter on his travels to Balbec, one lives at a minimum, and risks sinking into oblivion when too much is left to habit.

Sartre and Proust

In my previous post, I wrote about memory and inner reality, as they are connected to Proust's theme that memory and imagination transform life into art. There is the implication that life is only comprehensible as art and that there is a self, an interior consciousness, which directs the transformation . Jean-Paul Sartre provides an interesting companion to Proust's philosophy of the mind as presented in In Search of Lost Time.

I recently read an introduction to an anthology of Sartre's writings and an article by Christie McDonald, "Sartre Rereading Proust." McDonald's article reads Sartre's Nausea as a response to and rejection of Proust's In Search of Lost Time. In both novels, the narrators embark on a quest to create meaning by "decoding" sensory experiences and memories. Proust dramatizes the exploration of one's own consciousness throughout In Search of Lost Time, but, according to McDonald, Sartre dramatizes the failure of that search in Nausea. Proust's work upholds the notion that "sensation will give rise, in privileged moments, to an inner truth, culminating in the ability to create something new" (McDonald 199). In short, sensations are not simply sensations (to give a more pointed Proustian example, a madeleine is not simply a madeleine). There is considerable distance between the outside world of sensory experience and the inner world of the mind.

Sartre, however, rejected the notion of consciousness' ability to turn its attention onto itself and view itself as an object, and even more, he was critical of literature's role in the exploration of the self. The act of reflecting on experience puts greater distance between the individual and the direct (what Sartre calls pre-reflective) consciousness of "the thing itself," and distorts and limits the thing that narrative attempts to describe. In Sartre's view, the narrator of In Search of Lost Time is doomed to failure because, by dissecting his experiences, he is distorting and constraining the very thing that he wishes to comprehend. In reality, objects and events are indifferent to and resist the meanings that humans seek to impose on them, and so those meanings constantly elude our grasp; this is the unsettling feeling that Roquentin, the narrator of Nausea, encounters. Unlike Proust's narrator, Roquentin finds that writing does nothing to help him describe and understand his world and himself. Instead, he only becomes aware of the instability and uncertainty of existence. He feels that "there seems to be no distance between him and objects, no clear distinction between inside and outside" (McDonald, p. 200). Now, this is not entirely foreign in Proust; the narrator of In Search of Lost Time finds the lines between external and internal reality blurry. But, those lines still exist in Proust, and reflective consciousness acts as an interpreter of sensory experience. In Sartre, Roquentin cannot find distance between the intenal and external worlds, or depth beneath surfaces. The surfaces remain surfaces, the things are unendowed with meaning, and Roquentin experiences nausea from his inability to force the world into comprehensible terms. McDonald writes that, for Sartre, "consciousness only transcends immediate circumstances to the extent that consciousness can recognize the circumstances, nothing more" (p. 199). The meanings for which Roquentin searches are imposed on top of an amorphous reality. Furthermore, this structure of narrative and meaning can only be imposed retroactively: "Experience does not, cannot constitute an adventure, and it is a lie to think that it does" (McDonald, 202). McDonald implies that, in Proust, the meanings beneath objects are essential, inherent in the things the narrator contemplates and examines, and that life can become art in an instant.

McDonald's article adequately demonstrates the disparities between Sartre and Proust, but I find that there are many more similarities, especially in Sartre's notion of the transcendental ego. For Sartre, an individual is in "bad faith" when he tends too much in one of two opposing directions, facticity and transcendence. To retreat too far into facticity is to deny any transcendent part of the self, to identify completely with a particular role (such as one's occupation or social status); this results in emptiness, because the roles are convenient fabrications that provide a simple identity that denies "the thing itself," or the self itself. One cannot state one's identity; to do that is to pin it down, flatten it out, and excise large portions of the self. Retreat into transcendence is equally dangerous and produces the same result of emptiness; it's living in a fantasy world for potentials that never come to be and (I think this is where McDonald focuses perhaps too blindly) prevents action and engagement with real life.

I'm not certain that I would classify Proust's narrator as too involved in fantasy. As a child in Combray, he certainly has an active imagination, but it hardly prevents him from engaging in reality. Of course, he cannot create and experience simultaneously; all of his recollections of Combray come about during a night of insomnia, in the dark blank where sleep should be. Similarly, Sartre's Roquentin becomes annoyed when he must choose between continuing to write or departing from his narrative and rejoining life when a woman interrupts his work. Proust's narrator only appears to us in the past, and McDonald asserts, "The present exists. The past does not" (p. 203). In this way, one might say that Proust's narrator is divorced from reality by looking backward, by focusing so much on the past that he negates the present. Swann, however, appears to be most in danger of tending too much toward transcendence. I've started the chapter "Swann in Love," which details the affair between Swann and his present-day wife Odette, and from the beginning of their interactions, Swann's interest in Odette has to be fabricated by his imagination. He initially finds little in her that is attractive, but because she is so forward about her interest in him, he starts to will himself into admiring her; he imagines that she resembles one of Boticelli's paintings and, from then on, he justifies the time that he spends with her by relating it to admiring a living work of art. He rejects the real Odette before him and replaces her with an image of Boticelli's Zipphora, whom he can love and find aesthetically beautiful. This is dangerous territory, and Swann is setting himself up for disillusionment and emptiness.

I've written quite a lot on this subject today, but I want to continue this commentary between Sartre and Proust on the subject of experience and aesthetics. More to come as I do more research into this.