My Spring Break: Dutchmen and Danes

It's spring break wooooooo! In my grand tradition of taking tropical vacations and getting drunk off my face for spring break, I am writing an essay on Soren Kierkegaard and Washington Irving. (For the record, the bit about drunken spring breaks... in the past few years, I have spent spring break: taking the MTEL, preparing to defend my senior thesis, and visiting prospective grad schools. Yeah.)

Anyway, I wanted to write down a few of my main ideas for this paper, kind of sort things out here and then get cracking on secondary research.

While Irving predates Kierkegaard by a few decades, and there is no evidence of Kierkegaard regarding Irving as an influence on his writing or thought, what first got me thinking about reading these two in conjunction with each other is their use of pseudonyms and fictional sources. This is interesting to me in terms of authorial distance and textual authority. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous "editor" of Either/Or, Victor Eremita, is very careful to emphasize that he did not write these papers and functions in the text as little more than a reader, interfering as little as possible with the papers he "found" in a second-hand writing desk. Similarly, Washington Irving's narrator Geoffrey Crayon frequently references the posthumous papers of Dietrich Knickerbocker as the source of much of the New York Dutch folklore in the Sketch Book. Like Victor Eremita, Crayon regards himself primarily as a reader and an observer, not as the authoritive voice in the text, but a facilitator of a conversation between many texts. Rather than an all-seeing, detached, authoritative author capable of giving final meaning to the text as a whole, in both Irving and Kierkegaard, we get a multiplicity of voice, numerous and contradictory points of view that are impossible to reconcile. For Kierkegaard, this is very much the point, to have irreconcilable differences between texts so that the reader is forced to make an ethical choice between two mutually-exclusive absolutes. I think Irving employs numerous authorial voices and points of view to evade choice, so as to preserve the cultural multiplicity that he saw was dwindling in nineteenth century America. Irving counters the idea that there needs to be a single narrative for the nation; instead of the great American novel, he gives us a series of sketches that stretch across the Atlantic and across hundreds of years. Irving fights against homogenization of American culture by weaving together fragments of other cultures; he is especially fond of Dutch New York, perhaps because the Dutch were the first European settlers in America and he disdained the anglicization that began after the Revolution.

Geoffrey Crayon and A, the author of the first section of Either/Or, both refer to folklore frequently. Folklore and fairy tales are not authoritative texts; they come from the voices of the common people, coming to us from the indistinct, remote past. No one can identify a precise origin, a single author, in folk tales; rather, they are the result of multiple authors, each changing the myth slightly every time it is told, yet preserving something as well.

In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard describes the poet as the spirit of remembrance, and this is a very apt description for Irving's Geoffrey Crayon. Part of what makes Rip Van Winkle so comical is that he only slept for twenty years, yet in merely a generation, everything has changed so drastically that it is no longer recognizable; his community is alienated from the past, and as such, the individuals in it are alienated from each other. Rip Van Winkle, however, serves as a gathering point as the spirit of remembrance; he preserves the past that everyone has already forgotten. Rather than leaving a legacy of wealth for his own children, Rip Van Winkle leaves his stories to the community's children; he is not a father in the particular, insular family, but a patriarch of the entire community, initiating the liminal (children and travellers) into the society through his stories.

Authorship requires some distance, then; in order to be a storyteller, Rip Van Winkle abandons his domestic and work duties. He is not a man of business. Victor Eremita's name implies his distance from society as well; eremita is Latin for recluse, hermit. A also writes that he does not spend much time in society. Instead, he swoops down and retrieves pieces of it from time to time, bringing these scraps back to his nest to weave a tapestry of them.

There's a lot more that I'm going to write about this, but I need to do some more research first. I'm really enjoying this paper so far, though!

Teach and Learn

I may have mentioned before that I am about to start graduate school this fall, to get an MA in English literature. I'm still not entirely certain what my academic focus is going to be (since I have an array of disjointed interests like postmodernism, madness, theater, work and identity), but my game plan for what to do with that degree is to teach English at the high school level, preferably in a private school or prep school. With that goal in mind, I've been thinking about how to approach teaching; true, I need to re-learn how to be a student this semester, but I think it's best to consider the two in conjunction, teaching and learning. My goal is to be both a teacher and a learner.

One of my enduring interests in literature is the construction of identity through narrative, and I think that this is one of the most important things that I have to teach adolescents; they are responsible for constructing their own identities, and facility with language is essential in doing that effectively and resisting the narratives that others will attempt to impose on them. I want to start the school year with a creative nonfiction writing exercise in which the students think of themselves as narrators and characters. There are undoubtedly dangers and limitations in viewing one's own life in terms of narrative, but this exercise of actually constructing a narrative is one way to open the discussion about those limitations, the inability to capture reality and the self in words. I want my students to realize that narratives are everywhere, and to be thoughtful and critical of every narrative they encounter.

I don't think that it's unreasonable to introduce high schoolers to literary theory; many of the theories are rather easily explained, like Marxist criticism or feminist theory, for one thing. But more important is that I want to approach my students in the same way as Zarathustra regarded the Higher Men in the second half of the book: with an expectation that they are self-sufficient and capable.

A few weeks ago, I read an article on Zarathustra and Socrates as teachers of virtue; both initially made the same mistake of assuming a position of privilege and descending to their students. In Nietzsche's reading of the Apology, Socrates chose death because he realized the inherent failure of his work and was committed to the idea of being the fool who would be taken seriously. The teacher of virtue must certainly take his work seriously, because virtue is of the utmost importance, but not himself; he must maintain a sense of irony about himself, and Socrates would not do that, so he chose death. Initially, Zarathustra insisted on being taken seriously as well, and he also failed to reach his students when he descended to them from a point of privilege. Zarathustra, however, succeeds as a teacher when he chooses to be a squanderer and a fisher of men from a mountain top:

"What to sacrifice! I squander what is given me, a squanderer with a thousand hands: how could I call that-- sacrificing? And when I desired honey I only desired bait, and sweet mucus and mucilage, for which even the mouths of growling bears, and strange, sulky, evil birds, water:
-The best bait, as huntsmen and fishermen require it. For if the world be as a gloomy forest of animals, and a pleasure-ground for all wild huntsmen, it seems to me rather--and preferably-- a fathomless, rich sea;
--A sea of many-hued fishes and crabs, for which even the gods might long, and might be tempted to become fishers in it, and casters of nets, --so rich is the world in wonderful things, great and small!
Especially the human world, the human sea: --towards it do I now throw out my golden angle-rod and say: Open up, thou human abyss!"

Zarathustra approaches teaching as an overflowing of his own joy and wisdom, and the way to attract students is to throw out that excessive happiness, to lure them up to his height instead of him descending down to them. I want to teach in a similar manner, by imploring my students to "climb mountains" with me. I should not view them as deficient, but as capable and striving. I should challenge them to raise themselves, and show them how to do that by challenging myself constantly; I will also be a learner and model the life of a learner and striver for them. This is one way of avoiding the stagnation and complacency that has made me wary of teaching in the past; I have a responsibility to constantly improve myself, for myself and for my students too.

I want my students to view themselves as self-sufficient and to foster their independence. I know that they will not all love literature, and I might fail in reaching any of the goals I set for them, but it's important that I do it anyway.

If you never say your name outloud to anyone, they can never ever call you by it

I've returned! The grad school dilemma has been solved, for the most part, so now I'm back to writing these rambling little entries on literature and life.


I've inadvertantly encountered a number of discourses concerning identity and language in the past weeks, from very different sources: Samuel Beckett's novel The Unnamable, an interview on NPR, and the final chapter of Marcel Proust's Swann's Way. The essential question at hand is, what is the relationship between narrative and identity? And a subset of that is, what is the function of names in constructing an identity? Can there be a narrative without names?

I have asked these questions on this blog before, but these are questions to which I must return, continuously.

Each source provides a very different answer. The scholar on NPR insisted that there is no essential relationship between narrative and reflective consciousness; humans are not naturally narrative, and should not always use narrative as a tool in the process of reflecting on their experiences. He cited Sartre in the claim that narratives distort reality, and that reminded me of a post I had written earlier, in the particular distorting power of names. As soon as a thing is named, its identity pinned down to a consistent signifier, the name fails to address the thing's reality. A name cannot contain the thing itself, and neither can a narrative-- even a six volume narrative consisting of thousands of pages.

This notion of unnamability relates closely to Beckett's The Unnamable. The narrator of this strange novel, which has no real plot to speak of, is constantly beset by many voices, which define him and control him, forcing him to speak through a voice that is not his own, in a language that is not his own. The Unnamable longs and strives to find his own voice in this bewildering narrative, but he also desires silence. He seems to recognize that any narrative will fail to constitute an identity, or worse, will only impose on him a false identity. He yearns to recover his authentic voice, rather than continue to speak through their voices, and say something final about himself so that he may stop speaking altogether, fall into silence, and exist in pure selfhood. The tension between speech and silence is paradoxical; the only way, in the Unnamable's mind, to achieve full selfhood is to speak himself into silence, to recover his voice and then stop. I think that this is because the authentic self is so fleeting, that if he were to speak more than that single, definitive word or phrase, the voice of the other would inevitably resurface and he would have to begin the process of recovering himself again. If he could only identify when he has spoken something true of himself, and then fall silent, he would achieve ontological consistency.

According to Maimaitiming Aila, however, Beckett's characters are unwilling to entirely relinquish narrative because, without it, they sink into irrevokable oblivion. They cease to exist outside of the language that they use, especially the Unnamable, who seems to exist only as a voice. That language, though, is very inconsistent and confusing; names shift and metamorphosize, highlighting the tension between identity and anonymity. Characters have names, but they are temporally influenced; the names change over time, and through different places, suggesting that identity is not stable. Rather than the proper name functioning as "a reliable sign to designate a person, the narrators in the trilogy [of Beckett's novels Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable] hold it as a sign of the existence of a particular discourse, a moment in the stream of consciousness, and an expression of certain perceptions and ideas" (Aila, "Nothing but Dust: A Philosophical Approach to the Problem of Identity and Anonymity in Samuel Beckett's Trilogy," p. 129). This harkens back to the opening lines of The Unnamable: "Where now? Who now? When now?" These are three questions of identity; the "who" follows "where," is inseparable from "when." Time and space, then, determine identity, and because these are constantly in flux, identity is never stable.

Names are used to designate objects. In Beckett, the object changes, and the subject too, with time and place, with every possible world in which the object exists, and often, so does the name: "Beckett's practice of renaming characters reflects the idea that language obscures the reality it is attempting to depict. A name brings with it a superficial sense of a person's identity" (Rubin Rabinovitz, "Repetition and Underlying Meanings in Samuel Beckett's Trilogy," Rethinking Beckett, p. 52). The commentator on NPR would likely agree with Rabinovitz's assessment here; that language, and narrative in particular, obscures reality and is therefore inessential to the creation of an identity, perhaps even detrimental.

In The Unnamable, the difference between self and other erodes and the two become indistinguishable; the narrator is Mahood, Molloy, Worm, and all of the others who make up the shifting "they," whose voices he cannot stop from blending with, and overpowering, his own. Gradually, all of the distinguishing factors that comprise identity fall away: physical deterioration and uncertainty of the physical characteristics of one's own body (the Unnamable first says, for example, that he feels his hands are stuck to his knees, then later claims that he has no limbs at all), memory, and name, including the pronoun "I." The Unnamable questions his identity so radically that he claims that he can just as easily replace "I" with "they" or any other pronoun, any other word for that matter, and it would make no difference, because it is not he who is speaking.

In contrast to these views questioning the utility of narrativity is Proust. For Proust's narrator, language and narrative, and in the last chapter of the first volume, names are essential to comprehending reality. Language is an important part of reifying internal experience; although speech is part of the life of the mind, it also provides a link to sensual experience and physical reality. Speech is symbolic, but it's inseparable from the physical manipulation of the mouth and vocal chords; when the narrator seeks any opportunity to speak the name Swann, it's to bring Gilberte from the unreachable fantasy world she occupies in his imagination and into the concrete reality of his world. He is aware that saying words associated with her and repeating her name do not impact her at all, but they do bring something of her essence into his sphere and bridge the gap between them.

Proust does not promote the idea that the name is fully stable, however; when the narrator falls in love with Gilberte, every word and name connected with her is endowed suddenly with new meaning. His reaction to the names changes, even if the names themselves do not; the objects themselves also remain constant, uneffected by the referential shift the narrator experiences. The important thing is that the narrator's consciousness has changed, and this is why, in the final pages of Swann's Way, he laments the inability to fully recover the past; the physical relics of the past are insufficient, and so are linguistic re-tellings of past events. What he seeks to recapture is his consciousness at the time. Like the Unnamable and other characters in Beckett, the narrator is not the child whose experiences he recounts, although he remembers them. He cannot return to the consciousness of that particular moment, waiting for Gilberte in the Champs-Elysees, or to catch a glimpse of Madame Swann's carriage passing under the trees in a park. He continues to search for lost time, but he knows that it must remain, at least in part, permanently, irrecoverably lost, because he can never be that boy again. Time and place have changed, and so must he.

On that point, Proust and Beckett appear to agree (keep in mind that Samuel Beckett was a Proust scholar); a past consciousness cannot possibly be recaptured. In Krapp's Last Tape, the titular Krapp bears some resemblance to Proust's narrator; he searches his memory (for Krapp, it's recorded on spools of tape) and attempts to comprehend his past self. At times, Krapp does not recognize the voice on the tape, even though it is his own; there are considerable gaps in his memory. And there are things that he wishes he did not remember and impatiently skips over portions of his former self's narrative. At the end of Swann's Way, Proust's narrator appears to experience a similar kind of alienation from the former self. This narrator's memory is more reliable, perhaps, than Krapp's, but he nevertheless fails in the same task of recovering something of the past: "how paradoxical it is to seek in reality for the pictures that are stored in one's memory, which must inevitably lose the charm that comes to them from memory itself and from their not being apprehended by the senses. The reality that I had known no longer existed... The places we have known do not belong only to the world of space on which we map them for our convenience. They were only a thin little slice, held between the contiguous impressions that composed our life at that time; the memory of a particular image is but regret for a particular moment; and houses, roads, avenues are as fugitive, alas, as the years" (Proust, p. 606).

This is how Swann's Way ends, with a tinge of regret that the years can never be brought back to life, that places changes and the moment that has passed is gone forever. The narrative of memories that the narrator presents, however, seems to be at least a partial remedy for the impossibility of recapturing moments in the senses; he can, it seems, recapture these moments, even his former consciousness, through the act of constructing a narrative. This is where the debate arises; the NPR guest would claim that the narrative is falsifying and that he is never recapturing anything of the past, but only imposing a pseudo-reality onto his experiences. For the characters in Beckett's Trilogy, narrative adds to confusion and the oblivion of self, not the establishment of an identity. The characters' identities gradually disintegrate, and in The Unnamable, the monologue also deteriorates, slipping into contradiction and tormented uncertainty, culminating in the final words, "You must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on." While Proust's narrator can revisit and experience the entirety of his consciousness, "Beckett implies that our consciousness at its most fundamental level is elusive and anonymous, and that there will always remain an unthematic, unreflective, and opaque spot in the life of the subject" (Aila, p. 138).

Yet the narrative continues; the characters are not completely anonymous, not even the Unnamable. There is a measure of self-awareness that allows for narrative and prevents them from slipping away entirely into opaqueness. Language is an essential component of retaining a sense of self; Aila writes that "there is no point outside of language from which we come to express ourselves... the power of language becomes more and more a case of excess to such a degree that it anonymously speaks in the void: It speaks solitarily with itself in the end" (Aila, p. 141). Later, it is claimed that "Beckett thinks there is no 'I' prior to stories, to narrative, and, above all, to language. The self is a mere abstraction and fictional entity created in and through the effect of language, narrative, and self-perception" (Aila, p. 143). I'm not sure that I agree with that interpretation; language is important in Beckett, but silence, I think, is infinitely more important. On a metatheatrical level, as soon as the words end, the characters meet their demise; the curtain falls after they lapse into silence. But throughout the plays, from Hamm to Vladimir and Estragon to Krapp, the characters feel that there is something essential and authentic in silence, and so they strive toward it. It may be the end of this fabricated self created through narrative, but there could be a more genuine self, a pure experience of being without the falsifications of language, in the silence.

And what about the actor in Catastrophe? Like The Unnamable, the actor is bombarded with commands and manipulated by words, he is molded into something he is not; but then, he defies the narrative. He raises his face when he was told to keep it bowed. This is an act of self-assertion, I think, and it is wholly non-linguistic.

This post has rambled on to excessive lengths, so I think that I must lapse into silence and let this monologue end. I won't go on here, but I will be back to speak more of other things.